




# Exploring the Interaction between California's Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade Program and "Complementary" GHG Emissions Reduction Policies

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# EPRI Analysis of “Complementary Policies”

- EPRI report published March 2013 (EPRI Doc. #3002000298)
- Describes “complementary policies” adopted in CA, and potential impact of these policies on the operation of the GHG cap-and-trade program
- Available free online:  
[http://my.epri.com/portal/server.pt?Abstract\\_id=000000003002000298](http://my.epri.com/portal/server.pt?Abstract_id=000000003002000298)



# Key Insights

- The combination of CPs with C&T is not unique to California.
- Analysts differ on the efficacy of combining CPs and C&T.
- Expected GHG abatement in the C&T program is highly uncertain, ranging from **97-395 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e** (2013-2020), and depends on: (i) APCR; (ii) offset usage, and (iii) success of complementary policies.
- Total allowable offset supply is **218 Mt**. Offsets could account for **55-80% of total abatement**, depending on use of the APCR.
- The relative success of CP's in reducing GHG emissions will impact the amount of abatement required to achieve the cap, and allowances prices.
- Electric sector compliance "short" is directly affected by the performance of all of the CPs, including transportation sector CPs.
- CP's may increase net social cost of achieving AB-32 goals, as compared to a "pure" cap-and-trade program, but is likely to lead to lower "visible" CO<sub>2</sub> allowances prices.

# California's GHG Mitigation Program


- Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB-32)
  - 1<sup>st</sup> economy-wide mandatory statewide GHG emissions cap adopted in the U.S.
  - 1990 statewide GHG emissions by 2020 (427 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>e)
- **Direct regulatory measures**, also known as “complementary policies” (CPs), target emissions from key sectors, including transportation, electricity and industry (e.g., LCFS, RPS, EE)
- **Mandatory GHG cap-and-trade program (C&T)** with offsets
  - Cover ~85% of the state economy by 2015.
  - Compliance obligation began January 1, 2013.
  - The “cap” accounts for 334 MtCO<sub>2</sub>e of the 427 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>e target in 2020.




# California's Approach is not Unique

- Other regions and nations also have combined complementary policies with a C&T programs to address climate change, including
  - Quebec
  - Australia
  - European Union (EU)
- Waxman-Markey legislation (HR 2454) included EE standards and an RPS along with the C&T program
- If the U.S. adopts comprehensive climate policy in the future, it could utilize a similar approach as used in California


# California CO<sub>2</sub> Emission BAU and Emissions-to-Gross Cap 2012-2020



# California CO<sub>2</sub> Emission BAU and Emissions-to-Net Cap 2012-2020




# California GHG Emissions Abatement – Emissions-to-Gross Cap




Note: This level of abatement assumes the APCR is fully utilized by compliance entities.



# California GHG Emissions Abatement is Uncertain – *Gross Cap* and *Net Cap*




# Offsets May Comprise 55% to 80% of Expected GHG Emissions Abatement (2013-2020)




# Estimated C&T Compliance Shortfall in 2020

## Net Emissions-to-Cap (Mt CO<sub>2</sub>e)




Source: [http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/data/tables/2020\\_ghg\\_emissions\\_forecast\\_2010-10-28.pdf](http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/data/tables/2020_ghg_emissions_forecast_2010-10-28.pdf)


# Required GHG Emissions Reductions and Key Role of Complementary Policies in 2020




# Complementary Measures Reduce Expected 2020 BAU Emissions




# Required GHG Emissions Abatement (Base CP & Gross Cap)



# Required GHG Emissions Abatement (Base CP & Net Cap)




# Required Abatement is Highly Uncertain






# C&T Base Case Compliance Scenario (Emissions-to-Net Cap)



### Base case assumptions:

- The allowance reserve is not used
- CPs achieve their targets (49 Mt of reductions) (some small reductions not labeled in stacked bar)
- The maximum volume of offsets (29 Mt in 2020) is available
- Covered sector abatement address the remaining gap = 20 Mt
- CPs account for 50% of compliance

# C&T Compliance Scenario 1B: CPs Underachieve & Lower Offsets\*




- CPs deliver 33 Mt
- Only 20 Mt of offsets is available
- Covered sectors must deliver ~45 Mt (126% more than base case)
- Allowance prices increase; up to reserve level?
- CPs account for 34% of compliance

\* Scenario assumes APCR is not used

# Interaction of Complementary Policies and Cap-and-Trade Program

- Potential for all CPs to achieve estimated emissions reductions is **uncertain**
- If CPs targeting emissions in covered sectors achieve **fewer emissions reductions** than ARB estimated...
  - Covered sector emissions will be **higher**
  - Allowance prices will **increase**
  - Dynamic is reinforced if offset supply or hydro/nuclear generation is lower than estimated, or if economic growth is higher than expected
- If these CPs achieve **more reductions** than estimated...
  - Covered emissions will be **lower**
  - Allowance prices will **decrease** (but, total social costs may increase)
  - Dynamic is reinforced if offset supply or hydro/nuclear generation is higher than expected, or if economic growth is lower than expected

# Expected CA Allowance Prices May Depend on Offsets, CPs, APCR and Other Factors





# Thank You

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